Of the Brain and the Mind

[JanusX]

Okay here's a tough question which may not have an answer, but anyhow here it goes...

Lets assume that sometime in the future we have the medical/scientific ability to do a brain transplantation. (ie. Swap two people's brains) Now situation one: 3 People (A, B and C with bodies a, b, and c) We swap the brains of A with B. Now I believe its safe to assume that the mind of person A will be in the body b and the mind of person B will be in control of body a. This would be true from all 3 people's point of view.

Alright now lets say even further in the future people are able to create perfect replicas of objects down to their molecular structure. Now we change the experiment slightly. Situation 2: Again we have the 3 people (A, B, and C with bodies a, b, and c) Now this time we extract the brain of person A and use the replica machine to create a perfect copy of it (A2) now we put brain A back into body a and we put brain A2 into body b. Now unless we've spontaneously imbued brain A with telepathic abilities, it cannot be in control of both body a and b at the same time. So we now have a new 'consiousness' brain A2. From the point of view of person C both person A and A2 are the same person (from a mental stand point)

Now for the tough one. Situation 3: 2 people (A, C) we extract brain A and make a replica A2. Now the two brains are randomly mixed up by a computer and one is placed into the body a. Now from this new body a and person C's perspectaves everything is just how it was from the beginning. However there is a 50% chance that the brain in body a is A2 and so things aren't actually how they were and in fact mind A is dead/gone being replaced by this mind A2.

And the last one situation 4 (an alternate 3): 2 people (A,C) and a supercomputer which can physically dissaseble an object and the store it digitally. Then later reconstruct it from the digital backup. Now if brain A was extracted and digitized the recreated and put back into the body a would the mind in control be the original A? or would it be a psuedomind-A, A2? From person C's view it doesn't make a difference, regardless of which it is he will act the same. And the reconstructed mind would be unable to tell the difference of whether it is mind A or A2. Would there be any way of knowing whether it is the original mind A? or would that mind be destroyed and replaced by an identical mind A2?

Logically when I think about this I seem to alway contradict myself. I can't seem to put a finger on my exact dilema but perhaps someone else can shed some light or opinions on this situation? Hopefully what i typed here will make sense

[WindHydra]

Actually I thought of something similar too
It was a long time ago and wasn't well thought out, but my conclusion was that if there are 2 minds and 1 body, then one mind died O_O (which might means nothing to the rest of the world, as it only affects the dead mind)

[Proto]

Now this is quite interesting, and it all depends on the POV you want to take. From an external point of view (3rd person) it would be exactly the same as before. For the lucky mind who is inside the body it would also be exactly the same as before, even if its an exact replica. For the one that is kept inside the computer, if it keeps its conciousness (ie its no in stasis) it would perceive that something changed.

In the end we have to think about it in a relativistic way, aka there is no absolute answer, or if it is it is currently unreacheable because of our lack of knowledge.

[Vanit]

Thats a similar concept to what I have with teleportation. In theory the objects matter at is digitally recorded, the original matter is destroyed and then rebuilt at its destination. While it would seem like the person was infact teleported all that really happened was that the person was killed and duplicated at the destination. I guess the greatest conclusion you can make is that people don't have souls.

[wise_evian]

A nice thought and maybe far in the future. It is very difficult to do any kind of brain exchanges, you must consider blood type, tissue type, size of skull, etc.. many factors even if we could duplicate a brain.

[WindHydra]

We are just considering the consequences, not the actual transplant
I always find something uneasy about teleportation... now I know what it is thanks to Vanit

[Boltzmann]

We cannot even begin to answer this question without making some assumptions first:

1. The mind (and consciousness) is independent of substrate - i.e. functionalism is true.

2. There's no underlying metaphysical principle involved in conscious thought/decision making - i.e. there's no "soul" involved.

As far as cognitive science and the philosophy of the mind go, both assumptions are warranted by the available data. So I'll take them as a given here, without making any explicit defense (now, if anyone wants to challenge my assumptions...) Anyway, there's an interesting discussion about the preservation of personal identity here .

Let us analyze the situation, then:

Case 1: Quite straightforward - few people would claim that a mere brain swap would undermine personal identity (though we can argue that subtle personality changes would happen due to quantitative differences in hormonal production and other physiological factors).

Case 2: A and A2 are the same person only for a small ammount of time. As soon as their experiences begin to differ they will think/behave differently and we can effectively say that personal identity will be changed in the process (they will still be very similar persons, though).

Case 3: Since the two brains ( A and A2 ) are undistinguishable no matter which one ends in the original body we'll have the same individual as before (assuming that the copying process was error-free, and all neuronal connections and subjacent brain structure were appropriately replicated).

Case 4: Given my assumption (1), the reconstructed mind will be the same, no matter what is the substract where it's being implemented. Two caveats apply here, though:

1. The mind wasn't consciouss while it was digitally stored. If it was then the different experiences would produce quantitative changes.
2. The same conditions for a flawless copy as stated in Case 3 apply here.

So we can see that the basic point is: personal identity changes according to what is experienced. As long as two minds (A1 and A2, who are exact copies of the same brain, A) have experienced the same data there's no objective, measurable difference between them.

Now, I hope that what I've said makes some sense

[JanusX]

Looks like I have some things to read now, thanks Boltz

Yeah I agree with you Proto, it all comes down to whose point of view that we look at it from, because from everyones point of view except the "original" mind's POV nothing has changed, and that includes the "newly created" mind.

Nice point about the teleportation devices, Vanit, I had forgot about that one.

[Boltzmann]

You should also take a look at http://www.simulation-argument.com/ , it has many interesting arguments about the nature of our minds and lives. Look specially at the main argument in the article Are you living in a computer simulation? - it's certainly a lot of food for thought

And while you're at it don't forget to check out George Dvorsky's Welcome to the Unreal World column.

It has a lot of importance to the current debates in the philosophy of the mind...

[Pyre]

Jeez, it's fun reading this... great topic.

Now, although I believe that for the scenario given there have been some excellent things pointed out (most astute in my opinion are the necessity of identical stimuli to the brain during and after replication until the time of 'awakening' ... for want of a better word). And if you folks don't mind me butting in I'll throw in a few things of my own.

1) Situation 2 (variant): the awakening and the nature of the bodies, the twin principle: This is my favourite of the four scenarios... largely because of the vast amount of variance that may be applied to it. Above we look at the brains as one is created from another. I want to postulate another scenario, stopping here, that I think is quite relative to the next two (3 and 4). Imagine a perfectly symmetrical room, rectangular, and on two of the parallel sides there is a container for a single body. Now, a person 'A' with a brain 'a' is standing in the middle of the room. He is injected with a serum by a scientist with squeaky rubber gloves and then loses consciousness until the time that his brain, having been removed from his body, has been replicated(forming an identical brain a2), and his body, it's brain having been removed, has also been flawlessly replicated (forming an identical body A2) and now the original and the copy are each placed at opposite ends of the room, and the brains are in the exact center, on respective parallel walls along the line of symmetry, now, the brains regain consciousness. They move either both to their right or both to their left, and eventually get implanted simultaneously into one of the two identical bodies. At which time they are both awakened as tubes lift at the same instant. The eyes of both bodies flicker open in synchronism, and both stare at each other.

Now, there is an experimental issue still to be addressed: namely, 'Which brain is implanted in which body?' I say, since the stimuli are identical, it does not matter. Imagine whatever scenario you like.

Then what are the consequences of this testing of identical stimuli, are they not the same? These two individuals with identical bodies and brains and situations (including such minor details as what is on their left and what is on their right) would react exactly alike to any object brought in to maintain the symmetry (one might envision two black poles lowered from a point on the line of symmetry equidistant from the each other and similarly distanced from the sides of the room, if the two were to look at one of them, each would look to the one on his right, then, perhaps looking at the twin, would peer down simultaneously, and then back to his own pole or the one his twin was observing. Similarly, one could see the two staring at each other, trying to break the pattern and view the same one at the same time, to no avail, however, because they would wait for an exact moment and then both look to the same side, not willing to wait any longer.) The minds and, I say, the individuals, are the same until they are exposed to alternate stimuli, and only then do they develop different memories/molecular makeup and thusly become their own unit.

Ah, that was fun... and now for one more thing quickly...

Although mind-probing, I think this topic is really delving at something much more fundamental than brain transplantation: What is unique, what makes two things the same?

There are two possible options here. Either ‘same’ means that two units have identical molecular makeup and construction, or ‘same’ means two units composed of the exact same individual molecules and atoms in the same orders and arrangements (in which case, of course, no two things can be the same). There is a third option; that two things are the same when they look a whole lot alike (e.g. these two toys are the same) but that is only used in the practical and no the philosophical sense.

If ‘same’ means made up of the same atoms in the same order as the original, then Janus’ idea has far more breadth, for it implies the insertion of a different (for all things not the original are different) mind into an original body and the consequences of doing so. My personal opinion is that, since the minds are identical in scenarios 3 and 4, there is no real necessity for distinction of two units which are identical. To me, anyway, it does not matter whether the mind is the same one or an identical one within the body, it functions similarly, and there is no deviation from the actions of the individual if he were to have his original brain. As for the POV of the second party brain, the one not installed in the mind, it would likewise react exactly alike whether it is the original, or one of the copies.

As always, hope this makes sense, and provides some food for thought,
--Cheers,
James.

[Boltzmann]

Good analysis, Pyre (and excellent 1st post ).
I agree with all of your conclusions (about what the requirements for recognizings two minds as 'equal' are).

But there's an interesting twist in your symmetric room example, and it lies in the probabilities that are involved in the normal functioning of our brains. Let me see if I can make it more explicit here.

Recent advances in cognitive science have shown how our mind and cognitive processes (including vision, memory, reasoning, learning, planning, and language, to name a few) behave according to probabilistic inference models (such as stochastic differential equations, for instance, or Bayesian decision theory ).

So we can say that even if the available sensorial data is exactly the same we can still have two formerly identical minds behaving differently after a little while. Why? Probability. Given what we know about chaos theory and non-linear dynamics, our brains would produce different results as long as tiny differences in the initial conditions exist. And it would be quite a feat to replicate and implant two brains in two bodies in exactly the same way . Some small (even a 0.001% difference would be enough to create measurable differences in a chaotic system, see Lorenz 1962) difference in the initial setup (an asymetry in hormonal levels, for instance) would create two individuals that are slightly different, and the probabilistic models of inference will guarantee that we'll observe a different behaviour (not radically different, though, since their data sets are equal).

Some online references that hopefully will provide a lot of food for thought:

• Stochastic processes in biological and nanoelectronic neurons
• Probability reasoning in intelligent systems (a must read - a pioneering work )
• Efficient probabilistic models for inference and learning
• Probabilistic Inference and Learning in a Connectionist Causal
  Network

I hope I've made at least some sense once again

[JanusX]

Ah it's good to refer a poster to the forum

Okay here's my dilema. When you clone the brain both brains should in theory react identically to identical stimuli. (at least initially, after a while they would be 'unique') And so regardless of whether or not a brain is the original or not to all beings involved it would be identical to the 'original' and so you could say that the "mind" is identical. However lets take a look at a few more situations.

Two 'vats' one with a person the other without. Our super duper 3D xerox machine creates a perfect copy of the person in the other vat, without affecting the person in the original vat in any way. The new person is kept unconcious. Now the original person is 'disposed of' and the vats positions are switched and the room is reset to look identical. Now the person is revived. He is informed that the experiment is a failure and he can go home and get on with his life. To this person this is the truth, as well as anyone not involved it the experiment. The problem is that the people who performed the experiment know that he is not the original. Additionally the mind that was disposed of no longer exists, the persona that has taken over his role is simply and identical copy, a sort of twin seperated far after birth.

Now let's take teleportation devices. I can think of two possible methods of function off the top of my head. Either they chop you into bits, and transmit you over X distance in the form of energy or your matter. Or they slice and dice you while anylizing you. Then the anylized data is used as a blueprint to reconstruct you from matter/energy that is already at the destination. For either method though I have no idea whether or not the persona that is assembled at the destination should/would/could be considered the original or if that person would be the identical copy.

Of course unless looked at from an appropriate point of view both of these situations would be irrelevant. To everyone except the "original" everything is would be going on identical to how it was 'before' in fact they probally wouldn't even consider that there was a before. The original however, if it still existed would continue to be incontrol of the original body. And unless they gain the ability to 'control' two bodies at once IMO they should still be considered the 'original'.

One counter to all of this might be that if every action is a combnation of reaction to stimuli and random chance, ie we are similar to very advanced machines then you could certainly say that the original and the clone are 1 and the same. However the point that 1 control center can't be in control of 2 bodies would seem to still be in affect. And so there would still be a difference in the copy and original.

[Proto]

In the first case it wouldnt really matter at all, since the new cloned person received only minimal and subconcious stymule since the moment of its creation to its awaken, and the original one didnt had any significant stymule to produce a change its personality (before being cloned and killed of course ), we can say that the 2 persons are identycal, and almost the same (being the only difference the one I enunciated before) So leaving appart the methaphysical stuff there would be no difference.

Now we have to take into account that the chaos will always get in and this "creating an identycal twin atom per atom" is nothing but uthopical. As many people said before, the slightest change will cause an exponential diversion from the original person that will eventually create a new one (sort of....)

[Vanit]

When you try to define things like this the explanation is usually more complex than the reality.

[JanusX]

I guess one of the main questions I have is that couldn't using something like a telepoorter be like killing yourself and letting a copy take your place? Like sending a copy of an important document and shredding the original.

[WinterHell]

I think if there are 2 peoples that one is the clone,and the other is the original,in the same situations,face 2 face,no more than 1 or 2 their reactions will be the same.If the following reactions are different,that'll prove peoples can make a choice.So if we decide to do something,this is a random what we'll do.If there is a choice,no one can calculate 100% what we'll do or think.Even if there are computers that has I/O parts smaller than the atom.
Just the same as people will never find out is the Universe endless,or there is something outside it,why in the world is supposed to be somethings like atoms ,or vaccum.These are questions that people will never find out,because the time wont be enough for them.After 5,000,000,000 years there will be no earth.
To the brain question-Avery one thinks humans have souls.Are these "souls" just a combinations of atoms?However whatever is the truth,the place where the 5 body senses meets,there is the soul,somewhere in the brain.If we havent souls,we would be something like computers.The clones of people will do exactly as if they were the original,except the random "choice",which may be as random,as the computer can generate random numbers.The only difference between the original human and the clone will be that our soul is only in our brain.Lets say Bill Gates wants to live forever,and he makes a clone of himself,and so on.So there will be Bill Gates in the 2150th year,but not his soul.
The other people will never be sure which is the real man.Even both people will think they are the original,will try to prove it,but they wont have prove that the other hasnt.So the genetic shouldnt search only how to "clone" the brain,even the mind,but to find out how to move the soul to the new body.Then we can say it is the same person as 10 years before(for example).

[WinterHell]

Maybe will be something as in the Matrix with Agent Smith.In the first film we see him when he copies himself,but we are here for other thing.In Revolutions he wants to rule the world,and lets say there is one Agent Smith,the one in the beginnig of Reloaded,which leads the other clones.He knows he is he,and the others are his clones.And he wants to rule averything that he sacrifices himself for the succes of the all agent Smith.What am I talking about?When he transforms the oracle in agent smith,he steps backward and is scared,and he has his arguments-from now there is other agent that knows much more than him,and from now he's not the leader.The leader is Oracle's form.I can say that only 1 agent has the oracle's abilities,because when after the final battle,we finds the body of the oracle at the place of the destroyed agent.

[GALVATRON]

Originally Posted by JanusX

Okay here's a tough question which may not have an answer, but anyhow here it goes...

uhrr.... What is the point of this brain transplantation process if the end result is intentionally made indistinguishable from the beginning?

Simplify your logic experiment as follows: Let's say that in the future we invent a replicator. Push a button and out pop X exact copies of the original. Assuming all things are created equal, how can we tell these duplicates apart at their moment of 'birth'?


The problem with the hypothesis is that all things are not created equal.
Even in Pyre's above scenario of creating a birthing environment of identical visual symmetry, there are other external factors such as the respective direction of geomagnetic north that would affect each twin differently in some minute way. One could argue that the Earth's magnetic field would produce no significant short-term effect on human physionomy, but since we are interested in a comparison of behaviour aspects only (for the sake of individual identification), I would suggest applying further logical reductionism, scaling down the experiment to use not conscious beings but only twin elementary particles. By such amplification, we can now plainly see that these particles are more vulnerable to influence by electromagnetic forces or gravity, so their experience will be markedly different after all.

Conclusion: Although we might theoretically be able to perfectly duplicate the timing of initial conditions in our experiment, two objects cannot simultaneously occupy the same space, so they are in fact exposed to unique stimuli from the very beginning. It all depends on how microscopically we care to inspect for differences, where eventually we'll run into Mr. Heisenberg's limit in our probing.

("Yeah... but what happens if we perform the same experiment in deep intergalactic space with twin null-gravity generators located equidistant from the subject particles?" )


I think you're only introducing confusion into your conceptualization by using replicated minds because then there's a natural tendency to mentally project oneself into the experiment, whereupon you easily lose track of a detached viewpoint. At the quantum level, there's no such thing as "identical". The best your can do is to decide on a reasonable error rate for the replication process to yield humanly imperceptible differences, after which we can safely say: "ah, screw it, close enough!"

[Vanit]

Nice referrence to the Declaration of Human Rights. Its a good thing you brought that up because would a clone be defined as human?

[JanusX]

I think a clone would/should definitely be defined as a human, because what is a human, but a mass of particular 'human' cells from a particular person. Twins' cells are very similar some 'identical' (in the loose sense of the word ) Yet twins are obviously concidered human. Why should a clone be treated with any less respect.